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BLOOD FROM A TURNIP:
MONEY AS PUNISHMENT IN IDAHO
CRISTINA MENDEZ, JEFFREY SELBIN & GUS TUPPER*
The fines, fees, costs, or other financial obligations are staggeringly
high. On a weekly basis, in criminal cases, I order people who make
$9/hour to pay over $250 in court costs alone. That is without
restitution, without a fine, without a civil penalty, without restitution
[for] the victim, without public defender reimbursement, without the
costs of probation supervision, with the pre-sentence investigation fee,
etc. There is no way to get blood from a turnip. The greatest single
challenge is the blood from a turnip problem. Often, the cost for
collections [is more] than the order to pay. . . . Right now, the costs just
defeat the person from the very beginning.
– Anonymous Idaho Judge (2019)1
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1. OFF. OF PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS, IDAHO LEGISLATURE, COURT-ORDERED FINES AND FEES 36 (2019)
[hereinafter FINES AND FEES REPORT], https://legislature.idaho.gov/wpcontent/uploads/OPE/Reports/r1903.pdf (quoting Idaho judge).
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I. INTRODUCTION
On October 28, 2019, Peace Officer Kyle Rawlins cited Roxana Beck for a
parking violation in Mountain Home, Idaho.2 After further questioning and
investigation, Officer Rawlins arrested Ms. Beck for alleged possession of drug
paraphernalia and transported her to the Elmore County Detention Center where
she was booked into jail.3 At the time of her arrest, Ms. Beck was employed parttime at Burger King earning $12 an hour, so the Elmore County Court determined
that she was indigent and appointed a public defender to represent her.4
In February 2020, Ms. Beck pled guilty to “frequenting,” an Idaho
misdemeanor for being in a place where drugs are present, punishable by a fine of
up to $300 and ninety days in the county jail.5 At sentencing, the county prosecutor
proposed waiving the fine in exchange for Ms. Beck’s time served in jail.6 Magistrate
Judge Theodore Fleming nevertheless imposed a $150 fine.7 Although he waived
the public defender fee due to her poverty, Judge Fleming also ordered Ms. Beck to
pay $197.50 in court costs and a $291 “restitution” fee to a state laboratory.8
When Ms. Beck was unable to pay the $150 fine and the additional $488.50
in court costs and fees, Judge Fleming required her to enter into a payment plan.9
In debt for $638.50, or more than four times the actual fine, Ms. Beck signed an
agreement to make $25 monthly payments for the next twenty-six months.10 The
Judge also warned Ms. Beck, “so long as you pay as agreed, you would not be back
before the court under contempt. Contempt does carry up to five days in the county
jail and up to a $5,000 fine.”11
In July 2020, Elmore County initiated a contempt proceeding against Ms. Beck
for failing to make payments under the plan, and Judge Fleming issued a warrant

2. Answer to Petition for Writ of Prohibition at exhs. 1–2, Beck v. Elmore Cty. Magistrate Ct., No.
48475-2020 (Idaho June 24, 2021) (Affidavit of Probable Cause for Arrest; Verified (Sworn) Application
for Public Defender; Order Upon Request for Public Defender § 19-854).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. IDAHO CODE § 37-2732(d) (2020). Although beyond the scope of this article, critics have argued
that “when a person is charged with frequenting [in Idaho], it is essentially an admission that the state
could not prove one of the more serious charges directly related to illegal drugs. Indeed, one can be
convicted of frequenting without ever having come into contact with illegal drugs in any form at all.
Simply being present while knowing of their existence on the premises is deemed to be a criminal
act. . . . The sheer number of innocent people who could be charged with criminal frequenting makes it
a statute that is unconstitutionally overbroad and one that should be stricken from the books.” Geoffrey
Talmon, ‘Criminal Frequenting’ Is a Trap Door that Should Be Sealed Shut, IDAHO FREEDOM FOUND. (Oct.
24, 2014), https://idahofreedom.org/criminal-frequenting-is-a-trap-door-that-should-be-sealed-shut/.
6. Respondents’ Brief in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of Prohibition at 3, Beck, No. 484752020.
7. Id. at 2.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Answer to Petition for Writ of Prohibition, supra note 2, exh. 3 at 10 (Transcript of Change of
Plea and Sentencing Hearing).
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for her arrest.12 In addition to the amount of the outstanding fine and fees, plus
accrued interest, the warrant included a bond of $6,400, or ten times the amount
of her outstanding monetary sanctions.13 On October 29, police arrested Ms. Beck
on the warrant.14 When Ms. Beck was unable to pay the outstanding $638.50 debt
or post bond—a 10 percent cash deposit for her bond would have been $640—she
was jailed for contempt.15
After spending seven days in jail, Ms. Beck appeared again before Judge
Fleming, where she entered an Alford plea, accepting the consequences of (but
without admitting guilt to) contempt for failing to pay the original fine and fees.16
The prosecutor requested that the court order two days of jail time, credit Ms. Beck
$35 per day for the additional time in jail, and reorder the outstanding balance of
the fine and fees.17 Ms. Beck’s public defender requested that Judge Fleming waive
the remaining balance of the court debt in light of the jail time served.18 Judge
Fleming instead imposed five days for contempt (time served), credited Ms. Beck
for the two additional days she spent in jail, reordered the remaining amount of the
outstanding fine and fees (plus interest), and required Ms. Beck to reenter the same
payment plan.19
Starting December 15, 2020, Ms. Beck once again owed the court $25 per
month.20 Contained in her payment plan was the following escalation clause: “If . . .
you miss a payment, the entire sum will become due and a Warrant may be issued
for your arrest for failure to pay.”21 More than one year after her original arrest and
after spending more than a week in jail on two occasions, Ms. Beck remained under
the continued threat of arrest and additional jailtime for failure to pay more than
$600 in fees and fines.22
Sadly, Ms. Beck’s experience is not unique.23 Nationwide research over the
last decade has documented skyrocketing fees and fines in the criminal system that

12. Petition for Writ of Prohibition at 2, Beck, No. 48475-2020.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 3. An Alford plea allows a defendant to enter a guilty plea while maintaining their
innocence. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
17. Answer to Petition for Writ of Prohibition, supra note 2, exh. 3 at 12 (Transcript of Change of
Plea and Sentencing Hearing).
18. Id. at 12–13.
19. Petition for Writ of Prohibition, supra note 12, at 3. Ms. Beck was credited $70 for the time
she spent in jail, $35 per day. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See Petitioner’s Reply at 1, Beck, No. 48475-2020 (recounting that Ms. Beck was initially
sentenced in February 2020); Order, Beck, No. 48475-2020 (setting oral argument for May 2021).
23. Even in Elmore County, Ms. Beck’s experience is not an isolated incident. See Motion to Take
Judicial Notice, Beck, No. 48475-2020 (noting a nearly identical case after the filing of Ms. Beck’s cases
in which Francisco Aguila-Cardenas was subsequently jailed in a criminal contempt prosecution for
alleged failure to pay court debt).
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seriously harm people and make future system involvement more likely.24
Monetary sanctions fall especially harshly on low-income, Black, Latinx, and
Indigenous people, but fees and fines are not just a problem in populous states with
large communities of color.25 Mostly White and rural states like Idaho regularly
impose substantial monetary sanctions on people without the means to pay
them.26
Idaho law authorizes, and in many cases requires, state and local courts to
charge fees and fines to people in both adult and juvenile court.27 In 2019, the Idaho
Legislature’s Office of Performance Evaluations (OPE) published a report
acknowledging that “Idaho has made a policy decision to rely on fees and fines as a
considerable source of court funding.”28 The bulk of the revenue comes from fees
and fines assessed in criminal proceedings, and much of it flows to entities and
programs outside the court system.29 According to the OPE report, “[i]n fiscal year
2015, Idaho judges ordered about $65 million in fines, fees, and costs.” 30 More
recent data suggest that judges order an average of $19 million in fees and fines

24. See generally REBEKAH DILLER ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., MARYLAND’S PAROLE SUPERVISION FEE: A
BARRIER
TO
REENTRY
(2009),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/MD.Fees.Fines.pdf
(documenting the harm and recidivistic effect of supervision fees); Alex R. Piquero & Wesley G. Jennings,
Research Note, Justice System–Imposed Financial Penalties Increase the Likelihood of Recidivism in a
Sample of Adolescent Offenders, 15 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 325 (2017),
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1541204016669213 (showing the recidivistic nature of
monetary sanctions in youth populations); COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, FINES, FEES, AND BAIL: PAYMENTS IN THE
CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
SYSTEM
THAT
DISPROPORTIONATELY
IMPACT
THE
POOR
(2015),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/1215_cea_fine_fee_bail_issue_b
rief.pdf (discussing the disproportionate harm of monetary sanctions in low-income communities);
Tamar R. Birckhead, The New Peonage, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1595 (2015); Amanda Y. Agan, Jennifer L.
Doleac & Anna Harvey, Misdemeanor Prosecution (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No.
28600, 2021), https://www.nber.org/papers/w28600 (finding that misdemeanor prosecutions are
themselves criminogenic).
25. One recent study showed how localities ramp up DUI and drug violation enforcement against
Black and Latinx residents—but not White residents—during times of fiscal distress to meet their
economic needs. Michael D. Makowsky et al., To Serve and Collect: The Fiscal and Racial Determinants
of Law Enforcement, 48 J. LEGAL STUD. 189, 211 (2019); see also FRANK EDWARDS & ALEXES HARRIS, AN ANALYSIS
OF COURT IMPOSED MONETARY SANCTIONS IN SEATTLE MUNICIPAL COURTS, 2000–2017 (2020),
https://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/CivilRights/SMC%20Monetary%20Sanctions%20Re
port%207.28.2020%20FINAL.pdf (finding that, in Seattle, court debt falls most heavily on people of
color).
26. Harvard University and the Juvenile Law Center have thoroughly reviewed state statutes
authorizing monetary sanctions in both adult criminal and juvenile delinquency cases. CRIM. JUST. POL’Y
PROGRAM HARV. L. SCH., 50-STATE CRIM. JUST. DEBT REFORM BUILDER, https://cjdebtreform.org/ (last visited
May 2, 2021); Fees Established by State Law, JUV. L. CTR.: DEBTORS’ PRISON FOR KIDS,
https://debtorsprison.jlc.org/#!/map (last visited May 2, 2021).
27. See infra Part I.C and II.A.
28. FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 55.
29. FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 12, 20 (showing $10 million in civil fees and $52 million
in criminal fees and fines).
30. FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 22.
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per month.31 Although courts collect some of the charged fees and fines, Idahoans
cumulatively owe more than $268 million in delinquent debt. 32
Through the lens of the OPE report and Ms. Beck’s case, we will examine
Idaho’s growing reliance on both adult and juvenile monetary sanctions as a form
of punishment and revenue in the criminal legal system, with a focus on fees in the
juvenile delinquency system. We will situate Idaho’s fee scheme in the larger
debate about fees and fines nationally and how monetary sanctions contribute to
mass criminalization and racial injustice. Finally, we will recommend specific steps
for reform in Idaho. Rather than trying to find ways to “optimize” fee and fine
revenue, as the OPE was directed to do by the state legislature, Idaho law and policy
makers should end the harmful impact and administrative costs of monetary
sanctions.33
II. FEES AND FINES FROM FERGUSON TO MOUNTAIN HOME
The modern practice of charging criminal fees and fines in the United States
arose almost imperceptibly as a byproduct of larger sociopolitical trends beginning
in the 1960s.34 During the decades-long wars on crime and drugs, state and federal
lawmakers increased the number of criminal offenses and their immediate and
long-term consequences, often by stoking racial stereotypes and fears.35 At the
same time, Californians started a tax revolt in the late 1970s that swept the
country.36 Driven in part by suburban White anxiety, voters and lawmakers

31. See What Are the Fines and Fees Assessed in Court Cases?, IDAHO SUP. CT.,
https://courtdata.idaho.gov/stories/s/rbj3-wcbu (last visited Aug. 11, 2021) (“How Much Fines And Fees
Are Assessed Each Month?” subheading).
32. See How Are Delinquent Fines and Fees Collected, IDAHO SUP. CT.,
https://courtdata.idaho.gov/stories/s/cti3-7ezq (last visited Aug. 11, 2021). With a population of fewer
than 1.8 million people, the outstanding total is almost $150 for every resident of Idaho. Quick Facts:
Idaho, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/ID (last visited May 2, 2021).
33. FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 13.
34. Racialized wealth extraction in the United States did not begin in the 1960s. It is a legacy of
other forms of state-sanctioned abuse and control of low-income people, people of color, and Black
people in particular. See, e.g., Emma Coleman Jordan & Angela Harris, The New Black Codes: Racialized
Wealth Extraction, Economic Justice, and Excessive Fines Schemes in Timbs v. Indiana, LPE PROJECT: BLOG
(Mar. 11, 2019), https://lpeproject.org/blog/the-new-black-codes-racialized-wealth-extractioneconomic-justice-and-excessive-fines-schemes-in-timbs-v-indiana/ (tracing racialized wealth extraction
from slavery through the Black Codes to Ferguson and other contemporary examples); Alexes Harris et
al., Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in the Contemporary United States, 15
AM. J. SOCIO. 1753, 1758 (2010) (connecting monetary sanctions to convict leasing).
35. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW (10th anniversary ed. 2020); ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE
WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME (2017); ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME: HOW OUR
MASSIVE MISDEMEANOR SYSTEM TRAPS THE INNOCENT AND MAKES AMERICA MORE UNEQUAL (2018); ISSA KOHLERHAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN AGE OF WINDOWS POLICING (2019);
PETER EDELMAN, NOT A CRIME TO BE POOR: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF POVERTY IN AMERICA (2017); RACHEL ELISE
BARKOW, PRISONERS OF POLITICS: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF MASS INCARCERATION (2019).
36. Clyde Haberman, The California Ballot Measure that Inspired a Tax Revolt, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/17/us/the-california-ballot-measure-that-inspired-a-taxrevolt.html (noting how the passage of California’s Proposition 13 in 1978 inspired tax revolts across the
country).
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constrained the ability of state and local governments to raise general revenue. 37
Faced with the rising costs of mass criminalization and declining public coffers, state
legislatures approved both more fines in greater amounts and a growing array of
administrative fees charged to people for every aspect of their involvement in the
criminal legal system from arrest to incarceration and beyond.38
States authorize criminal fines to deter and punish law violations, sometimes
as an alternative to harsher sanctions, but often in addition to other punishments.39
Administrative fees in the criminal system, however, are not intended to be
punitive like fines, and cannot be justified in criminological terms. Fees are meant
solely to generate revenue from “users” of the criminal system.40 States charge user
fees for things like fishing licenses, highway tolls, and park entry as a mechanism to
regulate access to scarce public goods, services, or spaces. 41 By imposing criminal
administrative fees, however, states seek to generate revenue from people who
have not chosen to use a government “service,” who are not special beneficiaries
of a government system, and who are often the least able to pay.42
For people caught up in the criminal system, fees simply operate as another
layer of punishment despite their legal distinction from fines.43 In Ms. Beck’s case,
the additional court fees ($197.50) and laboratory fees ($291) only contributed to
her inability to pay the $150 fine that was supposed to represent her punishment
for pleading guilty to a misdemeanor. 44 Compounding the economic harm,

37. See, e.g., Kathryn Julia Woods, California’s Voters Revolt: Lynwood, California and Proposition
13, A Snapshot of Property’s Slipping from Whiteness’s Grasp, 37 UWLA L. REV. 171, 194 (2004)
(attributing Proposition 13’s success to White people’s desire to protect their property as a racial
entitlement); ROBERT O. SELF, AMERICAN BABYLON: RACE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR POSTWAR OAKLAND (2003)
(tracing the origins of Proposition 13 to residential segregation and racial politics); RICHARD ROTHSTEIN,
THE COLOR OF LAW (2017) (documenting how tax policy has contributed to residential segregation).
38. ALEXES HARRIS, A POUND OF FLESH: MONETARY SANCTIONS AS PUNISHMENT FOR THE POOR (2016).
39. Id.
40. Id. However, Idaho law seems to muddy this distinction—HB 530 labels all fees, fines, and
restitution as “Fees.” The legislative purpose notes that the funds derived from these monetary
sanctions are “vital” to the programs funded by the “fees”—suggesting that fines are not intended to
serve solely a punitive purpose, but also to generate revenue. H.R. 530, 64th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho
2018) (Statement of Purpose).
41. See Ariel Jurow Kleiman, Nonmarket Criminal Justice Fees, 72 HASTINGS L.J. 517 (2021);
ANDREW AUSTIN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45463, ECONOMICS OF FEDERAL USER FEES (2019),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45463.pdf.
42. See Jurow Kleiman, supra note 41.
43. FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 22 (“In practice, fines, fees, and costs can have a punitive
effect on defendants and have all been used to offset costs for various programs.”). Note here that we
are not addressing restitution to victims, which was not the subject of the OPE report or at issue in Ms.
Beck’s case. But restitution is a monetary sanction that imposes many of the same harms as fees and
fines, without much evidence that it provides effective support for crime victims. See The Reality of
Restitution, U.S. ATT’Y’S OFF. S. DIST. ILL., https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdil/victim-witnessassistance/reality-restitution (Feb. 23, 2015) (describing numerous barriers to the receipt of restitution);
Ryan Luby, For Victims of Crime, Collecting Court-Ordered Restitution Can Be a Nightmare, DENVER 7 (Dec.
12,
2018),
https://www.thedenverchannel.com/longform/for-victims-of-crime-collecting-courtordered-restitution-can-be-a-nightmare (describing the continuous frustration that the restitution
process causes victims).
44. Respondents’ Brief in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of Prohibition, supra note 6, at 2.
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enforcing monetary sanctions with the threat of additional fines, fees, and jail time
merely recriminalizes financially precarious people, without any legitimate policy
goal or discernible benefit to the state.
To provide some context for money as punishment in Idaho, in this Part we
describe key findings of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) investigation of
Ferguson, Missouri, after the 2014 killing of Michael Brown. As one indicator of how
Ferguson thrust fees and fines into the public consciousness, we then explore the
response of activists, academics, and advocates to this newly conspicuous feature
of mass criminalization. Finally, we share what we know about fees and fines in
Idaho, including the experiences of people like Ms. Beck in Mountain Home.
A. Fees and Fines in Ferguson
Shortly after Michael Brown’s killing in 2014, the DOJ launched two civil rights
investigations in Ferguson, Missouri. In one probe, the Justice Department
determined there was insufficient evidence to support federal criminal charges
against Officer Darren Wilson for the shooting death of Mr. Brown.45 In the second
investigation, however, the DOJ found that the Ferguson Police Department
engaged in a pattern and practice of conduct that violated the U.S. Constitution. 46
The DOJ also found unlawful conduct by the Ferguson Municipal Court related to
fees and fines and unlawful racial bias in both the police department and courts.47
With respect to fees and fines, the Justice Department first found that the
Ferguson Police Department prioritized revenue generation over community
safety.48 In a city of just over 20,000 residents, police issued 90,000 citations and
summonses from 2010 to 2014, or more than one per resident every year. 49 By fiscal
year 2015, the City projected receiving almost one quarter of its budget (23
percent) from fees and fines revenue, up from 13 percent only three years earlier. 50
Notably, the Ferguson Police Department evaluated officers’ job performances
based on how many tickets they issued.51 Indeed, the DOJ found that “the City
considers revenue generation to be the municipal court’s primary purpose.”52

45. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORT REGARDING THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE
SHOOTING DEATH OF MICHAEL BROWN BY FERGUSON, MISSOURI POLICE OFFICER DARREN WILSON (2015),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/pressreleases/attachments/2015/03/04/doj_report_on_shooting_of_michael_brown_1.pdf.
46. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CIV. RTS. DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 15 (2015)
[hereinafter FERGUSON REPORT], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/pressreleases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf (finding that the FPD
conducted stops without reasonable suspicion and arrests without probable cause in violation of the
Fourth Amendment; interfered with the right to free expression in violation of the First Amendment;
and used unreasonable force in violation of the Fourth Amendment).
47. Id. at 15.
48. Id. at 2.
49. Id. at 7.
50. Id. at 10.
51. Id. at 12.
52. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 46, at 14.
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Second, and relatedly, the DOJ found that Ferguson used “the police
department in large part as a collection agency for its municipal court.”53 The court
issued a “staggering” number of arrest warrants—more than 9,000 in 2013 alone
for over 32,000 different infractions.54 According to the DOJ, “[t]he large number of
warrants issued by the court … is due exclusively to the fact that the court uses
arrest warrants and the threat of arrest as its primary tool for collecting outstanding
fines for municipal code violations.”55 In other words, the warrants had nothing to
do with public safety but were “primarily issued to coerce payment.” 56 People were
jailed, regardless of their ability to pay outstanding fees and fines, in direct violation
of U.S. Supreme Court precedent.57
Finally, the DOJ found that Ferguson police and municipal court practices
disproportionately harmed the City’s Black residents. While 67 percent of Ferguson
residents were Black, Black people constituted 85 percent of all drivers stopped, 90
percent of drivers cited, and 93 percent of drivers arrested.58 Black drivers made up
96 percent of people who were arrested during traffic stops solely for outstanding
warrants, which, as noted above, were issued almost exclusively to coerce payment
of fees and fines.59 With the explicit goal of revenue generation, public officials at
all levels in Ferguson turned fees and fines into a form of racialized wealth
extraction from some of its most politically powerless and economically vulnerable
residents.
B. Ferguson Is Everywhere
The DOJ’s findings shocked many people, but Ferguson is not an anomaly.
While fees and fines had become a fixture of the criminal legal system in the late
20th century, state and local fiscal crises in the wake of the Great Recession of 2008
rapidly accelerated government efforts to fund courts, probation departments, and
a wide range of other programs through monetary sanctions imposed on people
with little choice but to pay.60 During and after the recession, local organizers, social
scientists, and national advocacy groups began raising the alarm, documenting the
nature and scope of the problem, and pushing for reform.
In 2008, young people in Los Angeles began fighting back against a fee
imposed by the county probation department on the families of youth detained in
the juvenile delinquency system. The Youth Justice Coalition (YJC) published the
first community report on juvenile fees, outlining their harmful financial, emotional,

53. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 46, at 55.
54. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 46, at 55.
55. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 46, at 55.
56. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 46, at 56.
57. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 46, at 57–58; Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983) (revoking
a defendant’s probation and jailing him for failing to pay monetary sanctions was unconstitutional
without an inquiry into whether such non-payment was willful).
58. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 46, at 62.
59. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 46, at 63.
60. See, e.g., Frank Edwards, Fiscal Pressures, the Great Recession, and Monetary Sanctions in
Washington Courts of Limited Jurisdiction, 4 UCLA CRIM. JUST. L. REV. 157 (2020) (concluding that courts
issued more debt during and after the recession).
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and legal impact.61 In response to YJC’s activism, Los Angeles County imposed a
moratorium on assessing juvenile detention fees in 2009, which it maintained until
2017 when the California Legislature repealed all state laws authorizing counties to
charge juvenile fees.62 In 2018, the county discharged more than 52,000 juvenile
fee accounts relieving families of more than $89 million in outstanding debt. 63
In 2010, sociologists Alexes Harris, Heather Evans, and Katherine Beckett
published the first academic paper describing the prevalence, magnitude, and
consequences of monetary sanctions in the criminal legal system. 64 Based on an
analysis of national and state-level data and interviews, the researchers found that
the imposition of fees and fines was widespread and increasing. 65 In terms of
magnitude and consequences, average assessments were often in the thousands of
dollars per person, imposing not only serious financial harm, but constraining
people’s opportunities and exposing them to further punitive sanctions.66
National advocacy organizations also began to fill the knowledge gap about
fees and fines. In 2010, the Brennan Center for Justice published a report on
criminal court debt.67 Drawing on data from jurisdictions with more than half of all
criminal cases nationally, the authors found that “states are introducing new user
fees, raising the dollar amounts of existing fees, and intensifying the collection of
fees and other forms of criminal justice debt.”68 In 2016, the Juvenile Law Center
conducted a 50-state analysis of monetary sanctions in the juvenile legal system,
finding extensive use of juvenile fees and fines with devastating economic,
emotional, and legal consequences for youth and families.69 A companion study by
criminologists found that juvenile fee and fine debt correlated strongly with
increased youth recidivism.70
The growing national recognition of the racial, economic, and social harm of
fees and fines has fueled a new reform movement. Under the Obama
Administration, the U.S. Council of Economic Advisors and the DOJ cautioned local
jurisdictions against imposing monetary sanctions that are unjust and at times

61. YOUTH JUST. COAL., GETTING PAID (2009), https://www.youth4justice.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/12/GettingPaidReportYJC.pdf.
62. Jeffrey Selbin, Juvenile Fee Abolition in California: Early Lessons and Challenges for the Debt–
Free Justice Movement, 98 N.C. L. REV. 401, 409–12 (2020).
63. POL’Y ADVOCACY CLINIC, BERKELEY L., UNIV. OF CAL., FEE ABOLITION AND THE PROMISE OF DEBT-FREE
JUSTICE FOR YOUNG PEOPLE AND THEIR FAMILIES IN CALIFORNIA 18 (2017) (reporting that California counties
discharged hundreds of thousands of accounts relieving families of more than $350 million in juvenile
fees).
64. Harris et al., supra note 34, at 1755 (noting that prior works on the subject “focus instead on
the advantages of using monetary sanctions as an alternative to incarceration and criminal justice
supervision”).
65. Harris et al., supra note 34, at 1769–71.
66. Harris et al., supra note 34, at 1771–85.
67. ALICIA BANNON ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY (2010),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_Criminal-Justice-Debt-%20ABarrier-Reentry.pdf.
68. Id. at 1.
69. JESSICA FEIERMAN ET AL., JUV. L. CTR., DEBTORS’ PRISON FOR KIDS? THE HIGH COST OF FINES AND FEES IN
THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 6–8 (2016), http://debtorsprison.jlc.org/documents/JLC-Debtors-Prison.pdf.
70. Piquero & Jennings, supra note 24.
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unlawful.71 System stakeholders, including national associations of law
enforcement officials, probation officers, state court judges, court administrators,
juvenile defenders, and lawyers have called for the reduction or elimination of fees
and fines.72 And in response to local reform campaigns, agencies, courts,
prosecutors, and lawmakers in states across the country have started to take action,
including abolishing fees and fines and discharging outstanding debt. 73

71. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, supra note 24; Letter from Vanita Gupta, Principal Deputy Att’y
Gen., Civ. Rts. Div., & Lisa Foster, Dir., Off. for Access to Just. (Mar. 14, 2016),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/subsite/mjc/docs/DOJDearColleague.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ADVISORY FOR
RECIPIENTS OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FROM THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ON LEVYING FINES AND FEES ON
JUVENILES (2017),
https://www.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh241/files/archives/documents/AdvisoryJuvFinesFees.pdf.
Former Attorney General Sessions rescinded the two fines and fees guidance documents. Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Off. of Pub. Affs., Attorney General Jeff Sessions Rescinds 25 Guidance
Documents (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-rescinds25-guidance-documents. However, system stakeholders are requesting the DOJ to update and reissue
the guidance. Letter from ACLU et al., to Merrick Garland, Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Just., & Susan Rice,
Assistant to the President for Domestic Pol’y, White House Domestic Pol’y Council (Apr. 7, 2021),
https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/content/uploads/2021/04/Letter-to-Biden_HarrisAdministration_-Fines-and-Fees-Reforms.pdf (Fines and Fees Reforms: Recommendations to the
Biden/Harris Administration); Letter from Juvenile Law Center et al., to Merrick Garland, Att’y Gen.,
Dep’t of Just. (June 7, 2021), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2021/06/2021.06.08-Request-for-Guidance-on-Juvenile-Fees-and-Fines.pdf (Request
to Issue Guidelines Eliminating Juvenile Fees and Fines). Through federal funding, Congress can also
incentivize states to end juvenile fees. See, e.g., Eliminating Debtor’s Prison for Kids Act of 2019, H.R.
2300, 116th Cong. (2019) (proposing to create a grant program for mental and behavioral health
services for at-risk youth with eligibility conditioned on states certifying they do not charge juvenile
administrative fees to youth or their parents or guardians).
72. NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUV. & FAM. CT. JUDGES, RESOLUTION ADDRESSING FINES, FEES, AND COSTS IN JUVENILE
COURTS (2018), https://www.ncjfcj.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/resolution-addressing-fines-feesand-costs-in-juvenile-courts.pdf; L. ENF’T LEADERS TO REDUCE CRIME & INCARCERATION, ENSURING JUSTICE AND
PUBLIC SAFETY: FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE PRIORITIES FOR 2020 AND BEYOND
17 (2020), http://lawenforcementleaders.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/04/2020_04_LEL_Policy_Report_Final.pdf; NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., THE COST OF
JUVENILE PROBATION: A CRITICAL LOOK INTO JUVENILE SUPERVISION FEES (2017), https://njdc.info/wpcontent/uploads/2017/08/NJDC_The-Cost-of-Juvenile-Probation.pdf; NAT’L TASK FORCE ON FINES, FEES, &
BAIL PRACS., PRINCIPLES ON FINES, FEES, AND BAIL
PRACTICES, https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0021/61590/Principles-on-Fines-Fees-andBail-Practices-Rev.-Feb-2021.pdf; ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp, Formal Op. 490 (2020)
[hereinafter ABA Formal Op. 490],
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/aba_form
al_opinion_490.pdf (Ethical Obligations of Judges in Collecting Legal Financial Obligations and Other
Debts); ABA PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON BUILDING PUB. TR. IN THE AM. JUST. SYS., ABA TEN GUIDELINES ON COURT
FINES AND FEES (2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_scl
aid_ind_10_guidelines_court_fines.pdf; ABA Resolution Abolishing Financial Conditions of Pretrial
Release in Juvenile Cases (2017) (adopted),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/annual-2017/2017-am-112d.pdf.
73. See infra Part II.
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C. Criminal Fees and Fines in Idaho
Like most states, Idaho law authorizes courts to charge a wide range of
criminal fees and fines.74 Unlike most states, however, the Idaho Legislature
recently commissioned a study of its monetary sanction regime, providing insight
into its purpose and rare public data about its labyrinthine nature, scope, and
impact. The findings suggest a somewhat contested system of fees and fines,
without stakeholder agreement about the wisdom of assessing and collecting
monetary sanctions from people who are mostly unable to pay them.
Ms. Beck’s $638 in court debt and more than a week in jail started as a $150
misdemeanor fine.75 While Idaho law authorizes specific fines for many crimes,76 it
gives judges the general discretion to impose fines in all criminal cases.77 But as the
DOJ investigation revealed in Ferguson, fines can also lead to overzealous policing,
prosecution, and punishment.78 Further, fines are often only the tip of the monetary
sanctions iceberg, hiding an increasing array of fees, surcharges, and other costs.79
In Ms. Beck’s case, Judge Fleming added significant monetary sanctions to the
punitive fine, ordering her to pay $197.50 in court costs and a $291 state laboratory
fee.80 Idaho law imposes an “administrative surcharge fee” in every criminal case,
including first-time infractions.81 In addition to these flat surcharges, courts are
required to charge for any “services” provided. For example, Idahoans must pay for
court-ordered evaluation, related treatment or counseling, and participation in
Drug Court and Mental Health Court.82 Courts are also required to charge “cost of
supervision” for probation and parole, as well as a fee for every hour of community
service they order defendants to perform.83
In addition to mandatory costs, courts may impose certain fees at their
discretion. People may be required to pay for their state-appointed public
defenders and for participation in diversion programs.84 Courts also have discretion
to charge people for electronic monitoring, alcohol testing, or drug testing. 85 Even
before adjudication, courts can charge people, including those who are presumed

74. FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 5.
75. IDAHO CODE § 37-2732(d) (2020).
76. See, e.g., id. §§ 18-802, 18-803, 18-804, 18-2408 (arson); 18-902 (assault); 37-2732(c) (drug
possession).
77. See id. §§ 18-112 (authorizing $50,000 fine for a felony conviction); 18-113 (authorizing a
$1,000 fine for a misdemeanor conviction).
78. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 46, at 3–4.
79. See supra Parts I.A–B.
80. Petition for Writ of Prohibition, supra note 12, at exh. F (Motion and Affidavit in Support of
Contempt Proceedings).
81. IDAHO CODE § 31-3201(3). Courts also add a mandatory surcharge fee to all traffic fines related
to motor vehicles. Id. § 18-8010.
82. See, e.g., id. §§ 18-8005 (alcohol evaluations); 18-8318 (psychosexual evaluations); 31-3201E
(Drug Court and Mental Health Court fee).
83. Id. §§ 20-225 (costs of supervision); 31-3201C (community service).
84. Id. §§ 19-854 (public defender fees); 19-3509 (diversion fees).
85. Id. § 31-3201J.
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innocent, for release on pretrial supervision.86 The law permits courts in some
circumstances to waive fees if it determines that a person is indigent and unable to
pay them.87
D. Idaho’s Evaluation of Court-Ordered Fees and Fines
In 2018, the Idaho Legislature commissioned an evaluation of court-ordered
fees and fines by the Office of Performance Evaluations (OPE). The OPE is an
independent office created by the legislature to evaluate the efficiency, costeffectiveness, and success of state programs and policies.88 The legislature directed
the OPE “to identify ways that would help counties optimize court funding from
fines, fees, and costs.”89 Consistent with the emphasis on revenue generation, the
OPE noted that “the interest in this evaluation stems from a perceived lack of
accountability for the collection of court-ordered financial obligations.”90
Collecting relevant data to make meaningful findings and recommendations
was difficult. Although the evaluators were able to gather some piecemeal data
from existing case management systems, statewide information from a new case
management system was not yet available.91 Therefore, the OPE had a relatively
small sample of cases and lacked systematic data, especially about the cost of
collections.92 Nevertheless, the OPE interviewed stakeholders, analyzed statutes,
rules, and court documents, and randomly sampled misdemeanor cases in Idaho.93
The OPE found that in 2015, Idaho courts ordered $65 million in criminal fees
and fines, and that the large majority of the courts’ gross revenue came from
monetary sanctions in criminal cases.94 However, the statewide collection rate in
misdemeanor cases decreased from 2000 to 2015, and there was a wide variation
in collection rates among judicial districts suggesting significant geographic
disparities.95 In 21 percent of cases in the sample, no payments had been made. 96
Overall, the OPE found a “substantial backlog” of court-ordered monetary

86. Id. § 19-2904A; S. 1300, 64th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2018),
https://legislature.idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/sessioninfo/2018/legislation/S1300.pdf.
87. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 20-225; see also FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 48 (mentioning
the lack of uniformity in Idaho’s fee waiver process).
88. FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
89. FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 13.
90. FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 5, 13.
91. FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 3.
92. FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 21–29. The Idaho Supreme Court recently began
publishing data about fee and fine collection, partially in response to the 2019 OPE report. Idaho’s courts
are completing the transition to the Odyssey case management system and the Idaho Court Data
dashboard relies on self-reported data that may be incomplete or incorrect. Idaho Court Data, IDAHO SUP.
CT., https://courtdata.idaho.gov/ (last visited May 3, 2021).
93. Misdemeanor cases were chosen because they ostensibly have the highest potential for
closing the gap between ordered and collected fines, i.e., the highest potential to improve their
collection rates. FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 29.
94. FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 22.
95. FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 6.
96. FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 8.
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sanctions.97 Court debt in excess of $50 can be collected from people’s state tax
returns, and as of July 1, 2018, the Tax Commission reported more than 206,289
claims for outstanding fees and fines from the Administrative Office of the Courts
totaling $195 million.98
Using assignment of a public defender as a proxy for poverty, the OPE found
that poor people were significantly less able to pay monetary sanctions.99 The OPE
noted that low-income Idahoans are overrepresented in the criminal system, but
neither Idaho law nor court policy specifies a standard for determining when
defendants are unable to pay fees and fines.100 Further, there is no standard for
writing off or waiving unpaid debt in Idaho, so courts rarely do it, though some
judges also reported that they rarely order discretionary fines for punishment
because the mandatory administrative fees are already too high and too hard to
pay.101
As the following diagram from the OPE report demonstrates, fee and fine
revenue can flow to dedicated accounts and programs, to the county court, or to
the state general fund. Notably, almost a quarter of the combined sanctions are
apportioned to highway maintenance and public schools, which are unrelated to
the criminal system.102 The gray portion indicates $276 in fines that the court
suspended, and it is unclear what dedicated programs that money would have
funded.

97. FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 45.
98. FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 45. This figure includes criminal and civil fees and fines,
though as noted criminal fees and fines represent the vast majority of court revenue. FINES AND FEES
REPORT, supra note 1, at 22.
99. The OPE based this conclusion on the fact that in cases where people were assigned public
defenders, they paid less toward fees and fines. FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 37. The OPE did
not collect information about the racial or gender identities of people ordered to pay monetary
sanctions. See generally FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1.
100. FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 18, 36–37.
101. FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 9, 18, 27.
102. FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 23 exh. 5.
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OPE REPORT SAMPLE OF FINES AND FEES DISTRIBUTION

In this example, a misdemeanor case involving a $1,000 fine and $203 in fees,
courts receive a relatively small share of the assessed amounts: $135 of the $1,000
fine—with another $90 suspended—and $15 of the $203 in fees. Small amounts of
the fees also support specific court programs under the “dedicated purposes”
category, such as drug, mental health, and family court services, court technology,
court interlock devices and electronic monitoring, and victim notification. Although
not reflected in the diagram, the OPE report notes that the judge in this case
ordered an additional $720 misdemeanor probation fee ($40 per month for 18
months), most of which is designated for the county.103 Finally, the portion of the
fees and fines that flows to the state general fund may be spent on anything
authorized by the legislature.104
System actors interviewed by the OPE researchers provided a range of views
about fees and fines. A few judges considered ordering fees and fines a central part
of their duties, but the “overall sentiment” was that monetary sanctions were too

103. FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 23.
104. For the purpose of its analysis, OPE assumed that the citation was issued by a county or state
officer, not a city officer. If issued by a city officer, the city receives 90 percent of the fine. FINES AND FEES
REPORT, supra note 1, at 22.
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high, and some judges and clerks chafed in their role as debt collectors.105 One
Idaho judge noted that the courts have more important priorities, but policy
demands that revenue generation take precedence.106 Many argued that probation
officer time is eaten up “serving as . . . de facto collection agent[s].” 107 Notably, the
OPE’s analysis did not include the experiences and opinions of Idahoans who are
charged monetary sanctions.
The OPE acknowledges that “all $195 million in past due” court debt cannot
be collected, “regardless of what additional sanctions are applied.” 108 To improve
collection, the OPE recommends more frequent probation contact with people who
owe fees and fines and greater use of collection agencies, payment plans, and
review hearings.109 However, the counties already employing some of these more
aggressive collection practices did not have higher collection rates, and such actions
have diminishing returns as the likelihood of collecting unpaid fees and fines
“decreases rapidly” over time.110 The OPE also recommends gathering better data
on the cost of collections, because it is difficult to evaluate the financial success of
Idaho’s fee and fine system without more data about its cost.111 At the end of fiscal
year 2020, the Idaho Supreme Court reported more than $268 million in delinquent
court debt.112
Importantly, the OPE report focuses on misdemeanors, infractions, and
felonies in the criminal legal system.113 The report does not differentiate between
fees and fines charged to adults and those imposed on youth in the juvenile system
and their families.114 In the next Part, we begin to fill this gap by exploring courtordered fees and fines in the juvenile system. Juvenile fees and fines merit attention
in their own right because of their unique harm to young people and their families.
Further, there is a growing movement to abolish juvenile fees and fines nationally,
which provides an example for Idaho lawmakers to consider as they grapple with
the problem of money as punishment.
III. JUVENILE FEES IN IDAHO
Idaho’s Juvenile Corrections Code authorizes courts to impose fees and fines
as part of an alarmingly punitive delinquency regime. Youth of any age in Idaho can
be charged with certain crimes in adult court, and 14-year-olds can be charged in
adult court for any crime.115 The state has the sixth highest youth incarceration rate

105. FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 26–27, 36.
106. FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 41. “Everyone’s time is just maxed out. . . . Fines and
fees are not the highest priority.” FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 41.
107. FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 42.
108. FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 8.
109. FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 8.
110. FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 34, 46–47.
111. FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 47.
112. See How Are Delinquent Fines and Fees Collected, supra note 32.
113. How Are Delinquent Fines and Fees Collected, supra note 32, at 29.
114. It is unclear whether juvenile delinquency cases were part of the “criminal” category in the
OPE report. See How Are Delinquent Fines and Fees Collected, supra note 32, at 5, 11.
115. IDAHO CODE § 20–508 (2020).
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in the country, detaining its young people at almost 150 percent of the national
average.116
As noted above, fees are not designed to punish, deter crime, or serve any
other penological purpose. In fact, as the Idaho Legislature’s Office of Performance
Evaluations report clearly reveals, state legislatures often permit, or even require,
courts to charge administrative fees to generate revenue. In this Part, we focus on
the scope and impact of fees in the Idaho juvenile delinquency system as a uniquely
regressive and unjust tax on poor, rural Idahoans and Idahoans of color. First, we
describe the juvenile administrative fees authorized by state law. Next, we
emphasize the special harms that monetary sanctions impose on youth and
families. Finally, we explain why juvenile fees are not a reliable source of state and
local revenue.
A. Idaho’s Juvenile Fee Scheme
Idaho youth and their families can be charged fees at many points during a
delinquency proceeding. From the outset, a youth’s parent or guardian may be
liable for the costs of their “free” court-appointed public defender, even if the court
finds them to be indigent.117 Like adult defendants, if youth are released from
custody pretrial, they can be charged as much as $75 per month for supervision
before any admission or finding of guilt (or “adjudication of delinquency” in the
juvenile system).118 The court can also require young people to pay for electronic
monitoring or drug and alcohol testing ordered as a condition of pretrial release. 119
As a case proceeds, courts can charge parents for the mental health and
psychological evaluations that are often necessary in presenting a defense or
helping a young person recover from trauma. 120 If the court finds a child
incompetent to stand trial, parents can be charged for “competency restoration
programs.”121 If a youth is held by the County or the Department of Juvenile
Corrections pending trial, the court may order their family to pay the costs of
detention.122 Young people and their parents can also be charged for any

116. JOSH ROVNER, THE SENT’G PROJECT, RACIAL DISPARITIES IN YOUTH INCARCERATION PERSIST 6 (2021),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Racial-Disparities-in-YouthIncarceration-Persist.pdf (Idaho incarcerates 200 youth per 100,000 compared to a national average of
138 per 100,000).
117. IDAHO CODE § 20–514(7)-(8) (“The current inability of those persons or entities to pay the
reimbursement shall not, in and of itself, restrict the court from ordering reimbursement.”). Though
imposing financial liability for state-provided counsel would appear to belie common sense, it does not
run afoul of current Supreme Court precedent. See Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974) (holding that
indigent defendants entitled to a court-appointed attorney can nevertheless be charged for costs of
counsel if they have a foreseeable ability to pay without hardship).
118. IDAHO CODE § 20–516A(2).
119. Id. § 20-516A(4).
120. Id. §§ 20-519A(1), 20-511A. We use the term parent in this section as a shorthand. Idaho law
typically imposes juvenile administrative fees on parents, guardians, or other adults legally responsible
for the child.
121. Id. § 20-519B(7)(b).
122. Id. § 20-524(1)-(2); see also State v. Doe, 211 P.3d 787 (Idaho Ct. App. 2009) (holding that
due process requires parents receive notice and an opportunity to contest the award of detention fees).
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treatment, class, or counseling that the court orders.123
We summarize Idaho’s juvenile administrative fees in the following table,
including the fee type, the legal authority for the fee, the fee amounts, who is liable
for the fees (youths, parents, or both), and whether the fee imposed can be waived
or suspended due to the youth’s or parents’ inability to pay. As the table indicates,
under Idaho law, courts are authorized to impose most juvenile fees without
considering the financial circumstances of youth or their parents.

Juvenile Administrative Fees in Idaho
Fee type

Statute

Amount

Liable

Mental health
Appointed counsel
Pretrial supervision
Pretrial electronic monitoring
Pretrial drug testing
Pretrial alcohol testing
Psychological evaluations
Competency restitution
Substance abuse assessment
Training academy
Community service
Probation supervision
Court-ordered services
Breach of parental contract
Detention

20-511(A)
20-514(7)-(8)
20-516A(2)
20-516A(4)
20-516A(4)
20-516A(4)
20-519A(1)
20-519(B)(7)(b)
20-520(1)(i)
20-520(1)(p)
20-520(1)(q)
20-520(1)(r)
20-520(4)
20-522
20-524(1)-(2)

Actual costs
Actual costs
Up to $75/mo.
Actual costs
Actual costs
Actual costs
Actual costs
Actual costs
Actual costs
$20/petition
$0.60/hour
Discretionary
Actual costs
$1,000
Discretionary

Both
Parents
Youth
Youth
Youth
Youth
Parents
Parents
Parents
Youth
Youth
Youth
Parents
Parents
Both

Ability
to Pay
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes

Youth and families face many negative consequences for nonpayment of
juvenile administrative fees. Outstanding juvenile fees, like other court debt in
Idaho, are subject to a 12 percent annual interest rate.124 Parents who fail to pay
can be jailed for contempt, have their wages garnished, or have their tax refunds
intercepted.125 And long after a young person has been released from detention,
court clerks in Idaho can assign unpaid debt to private collection agencies. 126 The
private agency may charge an additional 33 percent of the person’s outstanding

123. IDAHO CODE § 20-520(4). Youth might have to pay monthly if placed on supervision and will
have to pay an hourly rate if performing court-ordered community service. Id. §§ 20-520(1)(q)–(r),
31-3201D, 20-225.
124. Id. § 28-22-104.
125. Id. § 20-520(5). Parents and guardians can also have their wages garnished or their tax
refunds intercepted. Id. Incarceration as punishment post-adjudication (after trial) carries the same costs
and consequences as pre-adjudication detention. Id. § 20-524(1)–(2). When young people are
incarcerated, their parents, guardians, or foster parents no longer receive federal or state public
assistance related to their child. Id. § 20-524(2).
126. Id. § 19-4708(5).
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balance as a “collections fee.”127 This means that years after a case is closed, a
young person’s debt can increase by one third, solely because they are unable to
pay.
B. Juvenile Fees Harm Youth and Families
Idaho is hardly alone in authorizing juvenile administrative fees. Almost every
state requires or permits courts, probation departments, and other system actors
to charge one or more fees to youth in the juvenile legal system and their
families.128 Juvenile fees around the country have been shown to impose economic
stress on family relationships and can force people to choose between paying rent
and paying fees. The fees worsen outcomes for youth, pushing them deeper into
the system, making family reintegration more difficult, and increasing recidivism.
And fees do not fall equally on all youth and families, exacerbating racial and
socioeconomic disparities in the juvenile system.
Parents report myriad ways that the economic harm of fee debt strains their
relationships with their children.129 Although parents recognize that courts, prison
systems, and probation departments impose the fees, the bills can lead to “a lot of
fighting” with their children.130 Many parents lament a system that takes their
children against their will, but asks them to foot the bill.131 The court debt also does
not go away.132 One mother testified to the Oregon Legislature that the state placed
a lien on her home, which remained even after she had paid off her son’s detention
fees, making it difficult to sell her family home years later.133 Orange County,
California, chased a single mother into bankruptcy after she sold her home but was
still unable to pay off all of her outstanding juvenile fee debt.134
Beyond the very real economic and emotional pain that fees cause families,
they undermine young people’s success during and after their juvenile system
involvement. In fact, Idaho imposes juvenile fees that have been found to drive
youth deeper into the system. For example, if youth or their families cannot pay the
fee for more lenient punishments like diversion, they risk probation violations,

127. Id. § 19-4708(4).
128. FEIERMAN ET AL., supra note 69, at 6–8.
129. LESLIE PAIK & CHIARA PACKARD, IMPACT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE FINES AND FEES ON FAMILY LIFE: CASE STUDY
IN DANE COUNTY, WI (2019), https://debtorsprison.jlc.org/documents/JLC-Debtors-Prison-danecounty.pdf.
130. Id. at 12.
131. Id. at 11–12. Youth also report missing out on important time with their siblings due to
working to pay off court debt or otherwise attempting to satisfy court requirements. Id. at 13.
132. See Collection Bureau, Inc. v. Dorsey, 249 P.3d 1150, 150 Idaho 695 (2011) (holding that
there is no statute of limitations for criminal court debt in Idaho).
133. Hearing on S.B. 422 Before the Committee on Judiciary of the Senate, 81st Leg., 2021 Reg.
Sess.
(Or.
2021), https://olis.oregonlegislature.gov/liz/mediaplayer/?clientID=4879615486&eventID=202102103
5 (testimony of Karen Cain).
134. Jeffrey Selbin & Abbye Atkinson, Time to End Injustice in Juvenile Justice System, ORANGE
CNTY. REG. (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.ocregister.com/2017/08/18/time-to-end-injustice-in-juvenilejustice-system/. The county later reported pursuing juvenile fee debt from dozens of families in
bankruptcy. Id.
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more fees, and incarceration.135 Criminologists have found that fee and fine debt
correlates to increased recidivism among young people, which undermines both
the rehabilitative and community safety goals of Idaho’s juvenile system. 136
Not surprisingly, the OPE report noted that low-income Idahoans are less
likely to pay off fees and fines.137 Although data do not exist on the socioeconomic
status of system-involved youth in Idaho, national research suggests that the vast
majority of children in delinquency proceedings are poor. 138 For example, the
Oregon Youth Authority reported that 96 percent of parents owing detention fees
lived below the poverty line.139
The rural-urban divide is a distinct but related disparity measure, because
rural youth are, on average, poorer than urban youth.140 A recent study of Colorado,
which eliminated juvenile fees in 2021, found that youth in rural counties were
charged significantly more in fees than their urban counterparts.141 This disparity is
particularly relevant in a state like Idaho, where about one third of the population
lives in rural areas.142
The OPE report does not mention race, but racial disparities in Idaho’s juvenile
system are well documented and increase the further a young person goes into the
system. Compared to White youth in Idaho, for example, Indigenous youth are
twice as likely to be arrested, more than four times as likely to be detained, and

135. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 20-522 (2020) ($1,000 fine for breach of probation contract; other
punishments for probation violations include incarceration).
136. Piquero & Jennings, supra note 24; see IDAHO CODE § 20-501 (“It is the further intent of the
legislature that the primary purpose of this [Juvenile Corrections A]ct is to provide a continuum of
programs which emphasize the juvenile offender’s accountability for his actions while assisting him in
the development of skills necessary to function effectively and positively in the community in a manner
consistent with public safety. These services and programs will individualize treatment and control of
the juvenile offender for the benefit of the juvenile offender and the protection of society.”).
137. See FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 37.
138. H. Ted Rubin, Impoverished Youth and the Juvenile Court: A Call for Pre-Court Diversion, 16
JUV. JUST. UPDATE 2 (2011) (noting that juvenile courts are considered courts of the poor and that juvenile
courts in wealthier jurisdictions are rare); Tamar R. Birckhead, Delinquent by Reason of Poverty, 38 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL’Y 53 (2012) (arguing that emphasis on family need when adjudicating delinquency has a
disproportionate effect on low-income children); JUST. FOR FAMS., FAMILIES UNLOCKING FUTURES: SOLUTIONS
TO THE CRISIS IN JUVENILE JUSTICE 28 (2012) (finding that of youth involved with the juvenile justice system,
more than 50 percent came from families earning less than $25,000 per year, and that roughly 1 in 5 of
these families spent over $1,000 per month on juvenile justice costs).
139. OR. DEP’T OF JUST., DIV. OF CHILD SUPPORT, CHILD SUPPORT INFORMATION RELATED TO OREGON YOUTH
AUTHORITY 5 (2020), https://berkeley.box.com/s/5mgugtq1ritzrvj86rylezbfin5yt9an. In 2021, Oregon
abolished all juvenile fees and fines and discharged all outstanding debt, including fees owed to the
Oregon Youth Authority. S. 817, 81st Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2021) (enacted).
140. Rural Poverty & Well-Being, ECON. RSCH. SERV. U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. (June 17, 2021),
https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/rural-economy-population/rural-poverty-well-being/.
141. Press Release, Colo. Juv. Def. Ctr. et al., Governor Signs Bill to End Juvenile Fees (July 6, 2021),
http://stand.org/colorado/blog/governor-signs-bill-end-juvenile-fees.
142. Idaho, RURAL HEALTH INFO. HUB, https://www.ruralhealthinfo.org/states/idaho (last visited
Aug. 11, 2021).
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three times as likely to be incarcerated.143 The state charges youth and families
additional fees at each stage of these proceedings, so juvenile fee debt continues
to accumulate as system involvement deepens.
C. Juvenile Fees Do Not Benefit the State
Idaho is beholden to fee and fine revenue by design. As the OPE report noted,
“Idaho has made a policy decision to rely on fines and fees as a significant source of
court funding.”144 In addition to the harm to youth and families described above,
however, the state incurs costs in assessing and collecting fines. Furthermore,
funding the judiciary on the backs of poor people creates clear conflicts between
judges’ interest in funding court operations and their duty to administer justice, and
it undermines public confidence in the courts.145 Finally, funding Idaho’s judicial
system from fees and fines limits the legal system’s ability to achieve other
priorities.
The OPE report revealed that about 90 percent of the judiciary’s budget
comes from monetary sanctions.146 The bulk of the revenue comes from fees
assessed in criminal proceedings,147 including fees charged in juvenile cases.148 But
a recent study found that it costs at least 100 times more to collect criminal fees
and fines than it does to collect taxes.149 The costs quickly add up: holding review
hearings, sending probation officers out to collect money, 150 developing and
administering ability-to-pay processes, contracting with private collections firms,
and—most harmful and expensive—incarcerating people who cannot pay fees.151
Compelling evidence outside Idaho suggests that juvenile fees, in particular,
are inefficient revenue streams. For example, in 2019, the Oregon Division of Child
Support spent $866,268 to collect $864,370 in revenue through the Oregon Youth
Authority’s incarceration fee program. 152 Before it repealed juvenile fees, Santa

143. United States of Disparities, BURNS INST., https://usdata.burnsinstitute.org/decisionpoints/13/idaho#comparison=2&placement=1&races=2,3,4,5,6&offenses=5,2,8,1,9,11,10&odc=0&dm
p=1&dmp-comparison=2&dmp-decisions=2,5,9&dmp-county=-1&dmp-races=1,2,3,4,7,5,6&dmpyear=2013 (last visited Mar. 5, 2021).
144. FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 55.
145. Poor people and people of color, especially Black people, are much less likely to feel
confident in the judiciary. Memorandum from GBA Strategies, to Nat’l Ctr. for State Cts. (Nov. 17, 2015),
https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/16164/sosc_2015_survey-analysis.pdf (Analysis of
National Survey of Registered Voters).
146. Compare id. at 12 ($52.7 million from fees and fines in 2015), with JOINT SENATE FINANCE HOUSE
APPROPRIATIONS COMM., IDAHO 2014 LEGISLATIVE FISCAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015, 62d Leg., 2d Sess., at 11
(2014),
https://legislature.idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/budget/publications/Legislative-FiscalReport/2014/Legislative%20Fiscal%20Report.pdf ($59.7 million total judicial branch budget).
147. FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 12.
148. Id. at 29 ($33.9 million of $52.7 million charged in 2015 was in criminal cases).
149. MATTHEW MENENDEZ ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., THE STEEP COSTS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE FEES AND
FINES 5,
9
(Nov.
21,
2019),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/202007/2019_10_Fees%26Fines_Final.pdf.
150. See FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 42.
151. FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 9–10.
152. OR. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 139.
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Clara County, California, spent $450,000 to collect less than $400,000.153 States and
localities also have billions of dollars in aging fee debt, which will almost certainly
never be collected and may distort their balance sheets.154
In spite of the considerable costs associated with assessing and collecting
monetary sanctions, Idaho incentivizes judges to impose fees and fines. In 2013, the
Idaho Legislature reasoned that, “because of the continuing economic challenge,
these funds continue to be needed to keep the courthouse doors open and
maintain essential judicial functions.”155 Perhaps even more troubling is the
legislature’s decision to direct fees and fines toward non-court expenditures.156 As
the OPE’s Sample of Fines and Fees Distribution diagram above shows, the
legislature is asking courts to act as a general taxing authority for many other
government functions having nothing to do with the judicial branch.
The Ferguson investigation is again instructive, where the U.S. Department of
Justice found that judges often faced intense pressure to generate money from fees

153. POL’Y ADVOCACY CLINIC, BERKELEY L., UNIV. OF CAL., MAKING FAMILIES PAY: THE HARMFUL, UNLAWFUL,
AND COSTLY PRACTICE OF CHARGING JUVENILE ADMINISTRATIVE FEES IN CALIFORNIA 18 (2017) [hereinafter MAKING
FAMILIES
PAY],
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/State-Juvenile-Fees-

Report_revised12-10-19-.pdf.
154. See FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 46–47; see also OR. JUD. DEP’T, COURT ORDERED
FINANCIAL
OBLIGATIONS:
IMPOSITION,
COLLECTION,
AND
DISTRIBUTION
12
(2018),
https://berkeley.box.com/s/b5f21m57yr12gqbl9nxynfehdb4iegm4 (“After year 5, collection drops to
less than 10%. [D]ebt . . . older than 5 years [is] virtually uncollectable.”). Alameda County was the most
effective at collecting juvenile court debt from youth—it was only collecting 8 percent of debt less than
six months old, and the collection rate decreased as debt got older. DEBT FREE JUST. CAL., IMPACT ANALYSIS
OF SB 144 (2020), https://berkeley.box.com/s/plejirhdxfkcuzz157xy7u9b940y2177. Furthermore, there
is no reason that criminal legal system debt would be any different from other forms of debt which have
long been known to decrease in collectability as they age. See George J. Wallace, The Logic of Consumer
Credit Reform, 82 YALE L.J. 461, 463 (1973) (consumer debt); U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
COMPOSITION AND COLLECTABILITY OF UNPAID ASSESSMENTS (1998), https://www.gao.gov/assets/aimd-9912.pdf (taxes); ELAINE SORENSEN ET AL., THE URB. INST., EXAMINING CHILD SUPPORT ARREARS IN CALIFORNIA: THE
COLLECTABILITY
STUDY
(2003),
https://www.youngwilliams.com/sites/default/files/u258/examining_child_support_arrears_in_califor
nia-collectability_study.pdf (child support); see also Marc C. McAllister, Ending Litigation and Windfalls
on Time-Barred Debt, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 449, 461–63 (2018) (discussing the decrease in price of older
debt as debt buyers view it as less likely to be collected). The Fines and Fees Justice Center urges states
to stop trying to collect court debt after three years, because at that point collections are “a waste of
government resources” and “harm low-income communities and communities of color.” FINES & FEES
JUST. CTR., TIP OF THE ICEBERG: HOW MUCH CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT DOES THE U.S. REALLY HAVE? 9 (2021),
https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/content/uploads/2021/04/Tip-of-the-Iceberg_Criminal-JusticeDebt_FFJC_20211.pdf.
155. H.R. 103, 62d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2013) (citing statement of purpose regarding Idaho
Code Ann. § 31-3201, which imposes a surcharge on every criminal defendant who “is found or pleads
guilty”).
156. Id. Fees and fines, under HB 530 of 2018, are both understood as a source of revenue,
creating a fiscal incentive to over-police and over-convict. H.R. 530, 64th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2018)
(citing routing slip statement of purpose). Further, given that the legislature acknowledges that fees, like
fines, amount to a penalty, fees should trigger the same constitutional protections afforded to those
who are fined. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
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and fines.157 As scholars have noted, “[t]he fact that such a system [in Ferguson] is
permitted to operate in a way that it generates such questions [about conflict of
interest] should, at least, fit a reasonable person’s definition of the ‘appearance of
impropriety.’”158
An Alabama judge was censured for violating his duty to promote confidence
in the judiciary when he directed indigent people to pay exorbitant fees regardless
of their ability to pay.159 As Michigan Supreme Court Chief Justice Bridget
McCormack noted in a recent concurring opinion:
No matter how neutral and detached a judge may be, the burden of
taxing criminal defendants to finance the operations of his court,
coupled with the intense pressures from local funding units (and
perhaps even from the electorate), could create at least the appearance
of impropriety. Assigning judges to play tax collector erodes confidence
in the judiciary and may seriously jeopardize a defendant's right to a
neutral and detached magistrate.160
In articulating principles on the purpose of courts, the National Center for
State Courts made clear that “[courts] are not established to be a revenue
generating arm of any branch of government—executive, legislative, or judicial.” 161
In 2020, the American Bar Association (ABA) issued a formal opinion stating that
judges are ethically required to undertake a meaningful inquiry into the ability of
court users to pay fines, fees, and other costs before imposing sanctions for failure
to pay.162 The ABA noted that such an inquiry is “a fundamental element of
procedural justice necessary to maintain the integrity, impartiality, and fairness of

157. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 46, at 14–15. It also documents the difficulty of resisting such
pressure. Id. Researchers have also found that "police departments in cities that collect a greater share
of their revenue from fees solve violent and property crimes at significantly lower rates.” Rebecca
Goldstein, Michael W. Sances & Hye Young You, Exploitative Revenues, Law Enforcement, and the
Quality of Government Service, 56 URB. AFFS. REV. 5 (2020),
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1078087418791775.
158. Peter A. Joy, Lawyers Serving as Judges, Prosecutors, and Defense Lawyers at the Same Time:
Legal Ethics and Municipal Courts, 51 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 22, 43 (2016).
159. Final Judgment, In re Marvin Wayne Wiggins, No. 45 (Ala. Ct. of the Judiciary Jan. 21, 2016),
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/assets/usa-judges-misconduct/13.pdf. He told
them to either donate blood or go to jail. Id. at 3. Apparently, the judge defended his fee practices by
arguing that the state court administrator “put a great deal of pressure on [judges] to collect. . . court
costs.” Ryan W. Toone, Criminal Justice Fines: The Role of the Local Court and a Review of Reform
Alternatives (May 2019) (Master’s thesis, University of Nevada, Reno),
https://scholarworks.unr.edu/bitstream/handle/11714/5775/Toone_unr_0139M_12808.pdf?sequenc
e=1&isAllowed=y (citing In re Marvin Wayne Wiggins, No. 45).
160. See People v. Cameron, 929 N.W.2d 785, 786 (Mich. 2019) (McCormack, C.J., concurring in
denial of certiorari).
161. NAT’L TASK FORCE ON FINES, FEES, & BAIL PRACS., supra note 72, at 2.
162. ABA Formal Op. 490, supra note 72.
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the administration of justice and the public’s faith in it.”163
To be sure, not everyone in the Idaho court system is enamored with using
fees and fines to fund the judicial branch and government more generally. In 2018,
then-State Supreme Court Chief Justice Roger Burdick raised concerns about the
legislature’s lack of clarity about how courts should distribute collected fees and
fines.164 The Idaho State Court Administrator noted that “a good collections system
[is] not necessarily an effective [judicial] system.” 165 Even the OPE report worries
that, “[m]any programs depend on fees and fines to offset costs, but judges’
decisions on fees and fines must be made without consideration of program
budgets.”166
The policy value of the OPE report is circumscribed primarily by the
legislature’s insistence that the courts self-fund and that the OPE limit the scope of
its inquiry and recommendations to optimizing collections.167 The report notes
some of the problems with such an approach, including the obvious potential for
conflict of interest in tasking courts to generate revenue, but it does not seriously
consider alternatives to the current system.168 In the next Part, we make alternative
recommendations for system actors and decision-makers to end the state’s reliance
on harmful and regressive taxation through criminal fees and fines.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
Ms. Beck’s case and the Idaho Legislature’s Office of Performance Evaluations
report are shining a light on adult fees and fines in Idaho, most of which have been
on the books for many years. At the same time, the Idaho Legislature adopted new
juvenile fees for pretrial supervision in 2020, including fees for electronic
monitoring and drug or alcohol testing ordered as a condition of release.169 This
expansion of an already-extensive juvenile fee regime puts Idaho squarely at odds
with the increasing number of states that have recently reduced or eliminated fees
in the juvenile system.
The growing state and local fee reforms are not coincidental or ad hoc. In the

163. ABA Formal Op. 490, supra note 72, at 1. The Fines and Fees Justice Center also issued policy
guidance on establishing more equitable ability-to-pay procedures as a first step “toward eliminating
government reliance on fines and fees.” First Steps Toward More Equitable Fines and Fees Practices:
Policy Guidance on Ability to Pay Assessments, Payment Plans, and Community Service, FINES & FEES JUST.
CTR. (Nov. 17, 2020).
164. Chief Just. Robert R. Burdick, State of the Judiciary 3 (Jan. 24, 2018),
https://isc.idaho.gov/legislative/2018_FINAL_SOJ_1-24-18.pdf.
165. OFF. OF PERFORMANCE EVALUATION, MINUTES OF THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE (2019).
166. FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 22.
167. FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 55. This limited ability to maneuver apparently left the
OPE with no choice but to cite, almost exclusively, de-published guidance from the National Center for
State Courts about fees and fines. See Letter from Mary McQueen, President, Nat’l Ctr. for State Cts.
(Aug. 10, 2020), https://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/accessfair/id/897/rec/1. The
National Center for State Courts has since asked courts not to rely on this 2009 guidance and updated
its standards to call on courts to reduce or eliminate fines and fees. Id.
168. FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 22.
169. An Act Relating to Court Fees and Costs, H.R. 463, 65th Leg., 2d Sess. (Idaho 2020),
https://legislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2020/legislation/H0463/.
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last several years, national and local organizations have partnered on a coordinated
“Campaign for Debt-Free Justice” to abolish monetary sanctions in the juvenile
system.170 In this Part, we recommend concrete reforms in Idaho that grow out of
lessons learned from more than a dozen state and local reform campaigns.171 We
focus on juvenile fee reform, but these recommendations apply with equal force in
the adult system. We begin by setting out specific steps for government actors to
take regarding juvenile fees, explain how half-measures are inadequate to address
fundamental inequities in the system, and describe why we think Idaho is ripe for
juvenile fee reform.
A. Key Action Steps
Idaho state agencies, counties, and juvenile courts can exercise their
discretion to end the assessment and collection of many juvenile fees immediately.
For example, relevant state agencies should place a moratorium on all
garnishments, liens, tax refund intercepts, interest accrual, and other harmful
penalties and collection measures. Courts should stop issuing and recall all arrest
warrants for unpaid court debt (juvenile court or otherwise), and they should never
refer fees to private collections.172 Different actors, of course, have different
degrees of discretion under Idaho law. But everyone, from the governor and the
legislature down to law enforcement and public defenders, can take steps now that
would mitigate the worst harms that monetary sanctions inflict on young people
and families.
The legislative and executive branches of Idaho’s government can end juvenile
administrative fees once and for all. The legislature should eliminate fees while
preserving funding for important state and local programs with tax dollars. The
legislature should also waive outstanding debt, which is unlikely to be collected and
can hang over youth and families for years.173 Governor Brad Little has issued
emergency executive orders during the COVID-19 pandemic, and he should also
issue an order to suspend state statutes and rules authorizing the assessment and

170. The Campaign for Debt-Free Justice is coordinated nationally by the Berkeley Law Policy
Advocacy Clinic, Juvenile Law Center, and National Center for Youth Law, which provide on the ground
technical assistance to support local, legal, and policy advocacy to end fees and fines imposed on youth
in the justice system. Berkeley L. Pol’y Advocacy Clinic et al., The Campaign for Debt-Free Justice (on file
with the authors). The campaign is funded principally by Arnold Ventures and Schusterman Family
Philanthropies, which also provide financial support to local partners. Id.
171. Many elements of these recommendations derive from a national call to place a moratorium
on all juvenile fees and fines during the COVID-19 pandemic drafted by the Berkeley Law Policy Advocacy
Clinic, Juvenile Law Center, and the National Center for Youth Law and signed by more than 130 groups
across the country and political spectrum. Call for a Nationwide Moratorium on Juvenile Fees and Fines
(2020), https://drive.google.com/file/d/1JmX2L9cArGxAL8yl4IjWolOB6XAQIFcz/view.
172. C.f. Collection Bureau, Inc. v. Dorsey, 249 P.3d 1150, 150 Idaho 695 (2011) (approving courts
and counties contracting with private debt collections agencies to collect fee debt).
173. Several states that have repealed juvenile fees prospectively have also waived outstanding
fee debt. See, e.g., S. 1290, 2019-2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2020) (enacted); H.D. 36, 2020 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Md. 2020) (enacted); H.R. 183, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2021) (enacted).
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collection of juvenile fees.174 Of course, the governor’s signature will also be
necessary for fee abolition legislation to become law.
Until the state legislature and governor act to abolish juvenile fees, County
Boards of Commissioners should pass ordinances barring the imposition of all
discretionary fees.175 County governments should also refuse to contract, and
cancel any existing contracts, with the private debt collection agencies that seek to
recover juvenile fees from Idaho youth and families.176 Counties, too, should cancel
outstanding debt from fees over which they have control, and notify youth and
families of the policies and practices in place to shield them from court debt.
Juvenile courts, while subject to state statute and county ordinance, have
enormous power over juvenile monetary sanctions. In addition to ceasing
imposition and collection of all discretionary fees, the courts should seek to limit
the collateral consequences of debt. For instance, courts should recall debt from
collection agencies and vacate arrest warrants for unpaid fees. Prosecutors should
exercise their discretion not to pursue fees in juvenile cases, not to prosecute
failure to pay fees, and never to condition plea agreements on payment of fees.
Probation and other law enforcement officers work closely with the juvenile
courts, but they have many interactions with youth and families outside of the
formal court process. Officers should ensure that probation is not extended and
that no probation requirements—like counseling, drug treatment, or anger
management classes—are denied because of a youth’s or family’s inability to pay
fees. Youth in detention should, at the very least, be able to call home for free.177
In general, youth should be diverted from the juvenile system and treated with the
least restrictive interventions possible. System actors should seek to avoid ticketing,
arresting, and detaining youth in favor of restorative and transformative
approaches to addressing mistakes and harm.178
Juvenile public defenders and community advocates will have to build and
experiment with non-carceral responses to children in need, but in the meantime,
they must intercede on behalf of youth to fight fees in court. Attorneys should

174. ASSOCIATED PRESS, Lawmakers Seek Long-Term Limit on Governors’ Emergency Power, IDAHO
(Apr. 16, 2021), https://www.kivitv.com/news/political/inside-the-statehouse/lawmakers-seeklong-term-limit-on-governors-emergency-power. The governor’s power is only expanded in a state of
emergency. See IDAHO CODE § 46-1008 (2020); see also Press Release, Off. of the Governor, Idaho,
Governor’s Emergency Declaration Secures Millions in Funding for Vaccination Effort (Mar. 2, 2021),
https://gov.idaho.gov/pressrelease/governors-emergency-declaration-secures-millions-in-funding-forvaccination-effort/.
175. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 20-516A (authorizing the board of county commissioners to establish
a pretrial supervision fee).
176. See, e.g., Bids: RFP No. 16083, ADA CNTY.,
https://apps.adacounty.id.gov/Admin/bids/bid.aspx?key=495 (last visited May 6, 2021) (Court Debt
Collection Services for the Fourth Judicial District Court of the State of Idaho); Katie Lobosco, Debt
Collectors Can Seize the New Stimulus Checks. Lawmakers Are Trying to Fix That, EASTIDAHONEWS.COM
(Mar. 16, 2021), https://www.eastidahonews.com/2021/03/debt-collectors-can-seize-the-newstimulus-checks-lawmakers-are-trying-to-fix-that/.
177. See Conor McClesky, Presentation at Idaho Law Review Symposium (Mar. 25, 2021).
178. Gus Tupper, Breaking California’s Cycle of Juvenile Transfer, 15 CAL. LEGAL HIST. 207 (2020)
(discussing transformative community interventions).
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object to the assessment of all discretionary and mandatory fees, especially fees for
public defenders, which can undermine children’s right to counsel. 179 Idaho
Magistrate Courts hear juvenile cases, and defenders should appeal fee orders to
the District Courts and beyond as needed.180 While fees continue to be imposed,
juvenile defenders should insist on entering information into the record about the
harms of monetary sanctions. Community members, organizations, and advocates
must push for these changes at every level to raise awareness and hold system
actors accountable for a more just system.
B. Half Measures Are Not Enough
More procedural protections will not effectively eliminate the race and class
bias in fee and fine collection.181 As noted above, Idaho law requires a judge to
determine a person’s ability to pay some fees, but not all.182 At no point during Ms.
Beck’s case, for example, did the Elmore County Magistrate Court assess her ability
to make payments, other than to determine that she was indigent and appoint a
public defender. Further, while the American Bar Association cautions that a robust
ability-to-pay process is necessary for the institutional legitimacy of the courts, 183
such procedural reforms do not serve other institutional goals of the courts or
government stakeholders.184
Racialized policing and the overrepresentation of Black, Brown, and
Indigenous youth at every stage of the juvenile legal system—higher rates of
arrests, referrals, and convictions, as well as longer time spent on probation and in
placement—mean that system-involved youth of color and their families are liable
for more costs and fees than White youth.185 Disproportionately harsher treatment
of youth of color results in higher financial penalties, which cannot be offset by

179. JESSICA FEIERMAN ET AL., JUV. L. CTR., THE PRICE OF JUSTICE: THE HIGH COST OF “FREE” COUNSEL FOR
YOUTH IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM (2018); NAT’L JUV. DEF. CTR., ACCESS DENIED: A NATIONAL SNAPSHOT OF
STATES’ FAILURE TO PROTECT CHILDREN’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL (2017).
180. THE STATE OF IDAHO, OVERVIEW OF THE IDAHO COURT SYSTEM, https://isc.idaho.gov/overview.pdf.
181. Theresa Zhen, (Color)Blind Reform: How Ability-to-Pay Determinations Are Inadequate to
Transform a Racialized System of Penal Debt, 43 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 175, 188–89 (2019).
182. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 20-225 (2020).
183. David L. Hudson, Jr., Judges Must Ensure Defendants Can Afford Court Costs Before Imposing
Fines and Fees, ABA J. (Aug. 1, 2020), https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/judges-mustensure-defendants-can-afford-court-costs-before-imposing-fines-and-fees.
184. Some legal scholars and advocates argue that reducing or eliminating fees and fines should
not be an excuse to expand the power of courts to monitor and invade privacy through alternative
sanctions and intrusive ability-to-pay analyses. Matthew Clair & Amanda Woog, Courts and the
Abolition Movement, 110 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 15–18, 27–28),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3785373.
185. POL’Y ADVOCACY CLINIC, BERKELEY L., UNIV. OF CAL., HIGH PAIN, NO GAIN: HOW JUVENILE
ADMINISTRATIVE FEES HARM LOW-INCOME FAMILIES IN ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA 9 (2017),
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/304784356_High_Pain_No_Gain_How_Juvenile_Administr
ative_Fees_Harm_Low-Income_Families_in_Alameda_County_California.
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ability-to-pay determination or indigency presumptions.186 Ability-to-pay analyses
are analogous to purported procedural protections elsewhere in criminal law,
which have been rightly critiqued as inadequate to address foundational racial
inequities in the system.187
The inequity of ability-to-pay mechanisms is compounded by the design of
judicial determinations, which must be invasive to have any probative value, but
are insufficient to guarantee both procedural and racial justice. These mechanisms
do not account or correct for underlying problems, including racialized policing
practices, racial wealth differences, and the cumulative effects of prior fees and
fines.188 Moreover, even when such determinations are required by law, courts
have “creatively skirted the rules or flatly disobeyed them,” and are often subject
to little or no oversight.189 Because the Idaho Legislature insists courts generate the
revenue they need to operate, the courts themselves should not be tasked with
meaningfully reducing Idahoans’ court debt through ability-to-pay hearings.
Perhaps most importantly, the focus on ability to pay elides fundamental
questions about monetary sanctions like juvenile fees. As described above, some of
the “key concerns” with ability to pay include administrative hurdles and economic
waste.190 But even if juvenile fees could be administered more fairly, larger
concerns suggest that we should instead ask questions like: Why should vulnerable
youth and families bear the burden of a justice system that is supposed to benefit
society as a whole? What are positive interventions to interrupt harm and violence
without further traumatizing youth and families? If we center the interests of youth,
family, and society in our inquiry, the idea of right-pricing such an unjust practice is
much less appealing.
C. Idaho Is Ripe for Reform
The OPE Report and Ms. Beck’s case paint a depressing picture about the
current landscape of fees and fines in Idaho, but we see reasons for hope. First, Ms.
Beck’s public defender filed a successful writ with the Idaho Supreme Court arguing
that the Magistrate Court had violated the federal Constitution by jailing Ms. Beck
for unpaid fees and fines without first assessing her ability to pay. Second, a
nationwide campaign to eliminate juvenile fees and fines has garnered bipartisan
support in many states, including some of Idaho’s neighbors. Third, despite the

186. See Alex R. Piquero, Disproportionate Minority Contact, 18 JUV. JUST. 59, 59–61 (2008)
(discussing disproportionate punishments, including monetary sanctions, for youth of color in state
juvenile systems); MAKING FAMILIES PAY, supra note 153.
187. For a thorough explanation of this phenomenon in the context of policing, see Amna Akbar,
An Abolitionist Horizon for (Police) Reform, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1781, 1806–09 (2020).
188. Zhen, supra note 181, at 193.
189. Zhen, supra note 181, at 187 (quoted language); Zhen, supra note 181, at 178 (“Ability-topay determinations often happen daily behind closed doors or in unmonitored courtrooms where there
is no oversight or regulation. They can occur in front of an audience with no intimate understanding of
the devastating conditions of poverty, such as a judge, an employee of the court, a collections agent, or
any person authorized by the court or county.”).
190. Beth A. Colgan, Graduating Economic Sanctions According to Ability to Pay, 103 IOWA L. REV.
53 (2017).
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legislature’s policy preference for funding the courts and other government
services through fees and fines, Idaho recently scaled back the reach of its punitive
monetary sanction regime by limiting debt-based suspensions of driver’s licenses.
In response to the writ filed by Ms. Beck’s public defender, the Idaho Supreme
Court issued a Preliminary Writ of Prohibition ordering the Elmore County
Magistrate Court to refrain from “[t]aking any additional collection efforts”
including “issuing any arrest warrant against Ms. Beck for failure to pay and/or
contempt pending further of this court.”191 The Supreme Court also prohibited the
Elmore County court from issuing arrest warrants against anyone else for failure to
pay fines and fees. Although Elmore County undertook to recall outstanding
contempt warrants for unpaid fines and fees, according to Ms. Beck’s lawyer,
people with unpaid monetary sanctions continued to be arrested and jailed.192
The Supreme Court heard oral argument in the case, and in June 2021, it ruled
in Ms. Beck’s favor, holding that “effectively turn[ing] a fine into jail time without
due process” violated the Fourteenth Amendment.193 Beyond the immediate
impacts—Idaho courts are now prohibited from jailing Idahoans who are unable to
pay fees and fines—the Beck decision presents the opportunity for courts to
reevaluate their monetary sanction practices. The decision may have the incidental
effect of causing judges to waive or reduce fees and fines rather than conducting
extensive ability-to-pay assessments.194 Local advocates have already started to use
the court victory as a jumping off point to recommend broader reforms to fees and
fines in Idaho.195
Seven states enacted legislation to reduce or eliminate juvenile fees and fines
between 2015 and 2020, including Washington, Utah, and Nevada .196 In 2021,
Oregon, Colorado, Louisiana, New Mexico, Texas, and Virginia eliminated some or

191. Order Re: Petition for Writ of Prohibition, at 1, Beck v. Elmore Cnty. Magistrate Ct., No.
48475-2020 (Idaho June 24, 2021).
192. See Motion to Take Judicial Notice, supra note 23 (noting that Francisco Aguila-Cardenas was
subsequently jailed in Elmore County on a criminal contempt prosecution for alleged failure to pay court
debt).
193. Beck, No. 48475-2020, https://isc.idaho.gov/opinions/48475.pdf.
194. Jacob Scholl, Idaho Supreme Court Issues ‘Significant’ Ruling for Those Who Can’t Afford
Court Fees, IDAHO STATESMAN (June 28, 2021), https://www.idahostatesman.com/news/politicsgovernment/article252362638.html (“The case drew widespread attention and will affect how courts
treat indigent defendants.”).
195. IDAHO CTR. FOR FISCAL POL’Y, THE HIDDEN COSTS OF FINES AND FEES IN IDAHO’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM (2021), https://idahocfp.org/new/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Fees-and-Fines-Policy-Review7-15.pdf; Eliminate Juvenile Fees, IDAHO JUST. PROJECT (2021),
https://www.idahojusticeproject.org/eliminate-juvenile-court-fees.
196. S. 5564, 2015-2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2015) (enacted) (repealing most juvenile fees);
H.R. 239, 2017 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2017) (enacted) (capping juvenile fees); S. 190, 2017-2018 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017) (enacted) (repealing all juvenile fees); S. 1290, 2019-2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2020) (enacted) (discharging all outstanding debt from juvenile fees); A. 439, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Nev.
2019) (enacted) (eliminating all juvenile fees); H.D. 36, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2020)
(enacted) (eliminating all juvenile fines and fees); S. 48, 2018-2019 Leg., 2d Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2020)
(enacted) (eliminating all juvenile fines); H.R. 1162, 2020 Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2020) (enacted)
(eliminating some juvenile detention fees).
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all juvenile fees, and lawmakers introduced similar repeal bills in another 8 states. 197
Additionally, local jurisdictions in states across the country and political spectrum
have abolished juvenile fees.198
When New Mexico Governor Lujan Grisham recently signed a bill ending
juvenile fees in her state, she noted that monetary sanctions were especially painful
for low-income families:
Nickel-and-diming New Mexico families doesn’t solve anything. On the
contrary, it can create a vicious cycle of fee collection and license
revocation, all of which serves only to entrap too many New Mexicans
in the criminal justice system. Instead, we need to be looking at ways
to reduce the administrative burden on families and reduce the
potential for recidivism, so we can focus on providing more
opportunities for growth to all youth and families in New Mexico. 199
Colorado State Representative Leslie Herod, who sponsored Colorado’s 2021
juvenile fee abolition bill, said, “Eliminating these fees would allow judges to stop
acting as cashiers and instead focus on rehabilitating kids and making communities

197. S. 817, 81st Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2021) (enacted); H.R. 21-1315, 73rd Gen. Assemb.,
1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2021) (enacted); H.R. 183, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2021) (enacted); H.R. 216,
2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2021) (enacted); S. 41, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2021) (enacted); H.D. 1912,
2021 Gen. Assemb., Spec. Sess. (Va. 2021) (enacted); H.R. 2385, 55th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2021);
S. 455, 93rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2021); H.R. 244, 151st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2021);
S. 1926, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2021); H.R. 1208, 122d Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2021);
H.R. 4987, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2021); S. 3319, 2020-2021 Leg., 2d Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2021); H.R. 246,
66th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2021).
198. See ORLEANS PARISH JUV. CT., STANDING POLICY ON JUVENILE ADMINISTRATIVE FEES (2018),
https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/content/uploads/2018/12/Orleans-Parish-Juvenile-Fees2018.07.19.pdf (locality in Louisiana); Katherine Burgess & Sarah Macaraeg, Shelby County to Stop
Billing, Waive Debt for Families of Juvenile Detainees in Memphis, COM. APPEAL (Aug. 27,2019),
https://www.commercialappeal.com/story/news/2019/08/26/shelby-county-stops-billingdiscretionary-fees-juvenile-detention/1718482001/ (locality in Tennessee); Dane Cnty. Bd. of
Supervisors, 2019 Operating Budget Amendment (2019),
https://dane.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&ID=6697774&GUID=FD523C89-C0E7-4F79-81E8BC2168BD6F72 (locality in Wisconsin); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Johnson Cnty., Agenda Review (2017),
https://boccmeetings.jocogov.org/OnBaseAgendaOnline/Documents/ViewDocument/BOCC_AGENDA_
REVIEW_4994_Agenda_Packet_6_29_2017_9_30_00_AM.pdf?meetingId=4994&documentType=Agen
daPacket&itemId=0&publishId=0&isSection=false (locality in Kansas); Phila., Pa., Res. No. 161029 (Nov.
17, 2016), https://phila.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=2892230&GUID=0830ED46-D598-413CBC9B-8859E0B0F6E2&Options=ID%7CText%7C&Search=161029 (follow “Signature16102900.pdf” link
to final resolution); Memorandum from Justin Kollar, Prosecuting Att’y, Off. of the Prosecuting Att’y,
Cty. of Kaua‘i, State of Haw., to All Deputy Prosecuting Att’ys (June 29, 2021),
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/FINAL-Fines-Fees-Kauai-DA-Policy.pdf
(juvenile monetary sanctions).
199. Maryam Shah, New Mexico Governor: Law Eliminating Fees for Juvenile Crimes, STL NEWS
(Mar. 30, 2021), https://stl.news/new-mexico-governor-law-eliminating-fees-for-juvenilecrimes/441499/.
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safer.”200 Governor Grisham and Representative Herod succinctly summarized why
juvenile fees are bad policy—they harm families, prolong and deepen system
involvement for young people, and undermine community safety. These are many
of the key harms animating the national campaign against juvenile monetary
sanctions.
The parallel movement to end debt-based driver’s license suspensions reflects
some appetite for monetary sanction reform in Idaho.201 With the enactment of
House Bill 599 in 2018, Idaho limited the harmful practice of suspending driver‘s
licenses for failure to pay outstanding court debt, even in the face of concern from
judges and clerks that reducing this sanction would hamper debt collection. 202 Like
juvenile fees, losing a driver’s license can be especially punitive in rural states with
little public transit infrastructure. Advocates argue that there is no logical
connection between driving and paying court fees and note that the punishments
for driving on a suspended license are severe and fall disproportionately on people
of color.203 Importantly, the fiscal note for the HB 599 estimated a savings to the
state of $9 million, despite any alleged reduction in fee and fine collection.204
System actors in Idaho can learn from other states’ experiences ending
juvenile fees. We now have clear evidence that juvenile fee abolition reduces harm
to youth and families without negatively impacting bottom lines in state and local
budgets. States have considered and rejected illusory fixes like ability-to-pay
provisions, recognizing the futility in trying to mend the fundamental injustice of
juvenile fees. Much work lies ahead to build a movement to end juvenile fees in
Idaho, but law and policy makers at all levels of government can begin taking steps
now to end this regressive and racially discriminatory practice.
VI. CONCLUSION
More than a year after her arrest, the Idaho Supreme Court recognized the
extreme injustice imposed on Ms. Beck by the Elmore County Magistrate Court:

200. Leslie Herod, Rep. Herod: Eliminating Juvenile-Justice Fees Means Better Justice for
Juveniles, COLO. SUN (May 23, 2021), https://coloradosun.com/2021/05/23/eliminating-juvenile-justicefees-opinion/.
201. See National Driver’s License Suspension Campaign: Free to Drive, FINES & FEES JUST. CTR. (June
25,
2019),
https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/campaigns/national-drivers-license-suspensioncampaign-free-to-drive/; H.R. 599, 64th Leg., 2d Sess. (Idaho 2018).
202. Idaho H.R. 599; see also FINES AND FEES REPORT, supra note 1, at 30 (“A few judges and elected
clerks were concerned that collection rates on infractions cases may decline as a result of recent changes
made by the Legislature. In 2018, House Bill 599 revised Idaho Code § 49-328(3) to no longer allow a
person’s driver’s license to be suspended for failure to pay an infraction penalty. As of yet, there has
been no clear evidence that the change has affected collection rates on infraction cases. However, given
the concern expressed by judges and elected clerks, the impact of the change may need additional
analysis.”).
203. RACIAL JUST. PROJECT, N.Y. L. SCH., DRIVING WHILE BLACK AND LATINX: STOPS, FINES, FEES, AND UNJUST
DEBT (2020), https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org/content/uploads/2020/02/RJP.-Drivers-LicenseSuspension.-Final.pdf.
204. RS26012C1 Statement of Purpose / Fiscal Note H0599 (2018),
https://legislature.idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/sessioninfo/2018/legislation/H0599SOP.pdf.
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Beck’s choices when presented with her warrant of attachment were
to (1) pay $643.72 to purge the contempt; (2) pay roughly $640 to a bail
bond agent to post bail; or (3) go to jail. In other words, the bail amount
set by the magistrate court had the practical effect of converting Beck’s
court-ordered fines into jail time if she could not afford to pay roughly
$640.205
In vindicating Ms. Beck’s constitutional claims, the Idaho Supreme Court
reasserted the importance of decades of U.S. Supreme Court precedent and took
an important step toward guaranteeing debt free justice to thousands of Idahoans
suffocating under the heavy burden of fees and fines.
Ms. Beck’s victory, however, only provides relief from the worst abuses—
jailing people without determining their ability to pay monetary sanctions. The
answer is not to treat these procedural symptoms of the harm, but to abolish its
source. As the Idaho judge quoted in the Idaho Legislature’s Office of Performance
Evaluations report stated so evocatively, “there is no way to get blood from a
turnip.”206
In addition to Ms. Beck’s case, the OPE report offers a clear opportunity for
reflection and course correction in Idaho. The OPE heeded the charge of the
legislature to focus on how to improve the collection of fees and fines, but it is not
hard to see through the data and sense a lack of enthusiasm for this mandate. The
report’s authors acknowledge the reality that most people in the criminal system
are low-income, that courts cannot become tax collectors, and that many of its
suggested revenue-optimization strategies have not succeeded. Hundreds of
millions of dollars in outstanding debt menacing vulnerable Idahoans is a testament
to a failed policy that requires reexamination and reform.
State-sanctioned racialized wealth extraction in Ferguson put fees and fines
on the map. Activists, advocates, and academics have taken up the cause to address
this injustice through evidence-based state and local reform. With national
momentum behind juvenile fee and fine reform and in-state attention to the OPE
report and the plight of people like Roxana Beck, Idaho can stop trying to get blood
from a turnip and end its system of money as punishment.

205. Beck v. Elmore Cty. Magistrate Ct., No. 48475-2020, slip op. at 20 (Idaho June 24, 2021),
https://isc.idaho.gov/opinions/48475.pdf.
206. Order Re: Petition for Writ of Prohibition at 1, Beck, No. 48475-2020,
https://isc.idaho.gov/opinions/beck.pdf (setting the case for oral argument on May 7, 2021).

